This site is dedicated to my dad William Burton Rogers!
Go Here to see the Page dedicated to my oldest daughter
This page is set to Jim Reeves' Gospel
song "Precious memories" because after all of these years that is
all I really have of my Dad is "Precious
memories"! You will need
realplayer installed to hear the song.
I began living with my grandparents near Wibaux Montana when I was 2 years old. I was 4 years 8 months, and 12 days old when a railroad accident took my dad from me, and as you can imagine I never knew my dad. I have only heard stories told to me by my granddad. I have had to learn about my dad from other people and what I have recently read from reports such as the accident reports. One does not learn much form accident reports except how your dad may have died on a cold January day in North Dakota. Tempatures in Bismark the day of the accident was 28 degrees.
From other people I have learned that dad was a kind, gentle, caring, and sharing person. He was born on the farm, not in a hospital, and was the oldest of 5 kids. He was always taking his younger bothers and sister to the movies because they generally never had the money to pay their way to the movies but dad did, so he would take them. He was always happy to do that! Dad had a Rose Royce touring car that he would take them to the movies in. I remember that old car. It used to sit behind the granary on the farm. When I was still a young boy my granddad sold the car for nearly nothing. Dad always found something to laugh about even in the worst of times. When others were feeling bad he could and would always find a way to make them laugh and feel better.
I began living with my grandparents near Wibaux Montana when I was 2 years old. I was 4 years 8 months, and 12 days old when a railroad accident took my dad from me, and as you can imagine I never knew my dad. I have only heard stories told to me by my granddad. I have had to learn about my dad from other people and what I have recently read from reports such as the accident reports. One does not learn much form accident reports except how your dad may have died on a cold January day in North Dakota. Tempatures in Bismark the day of the accident was 28 degrees.
From other people I have learned that dad was a kind, gentle, caring, and sharing person. He was born on the farm, not in a hospital, and was the oldest of 5 kids. He was always taking his younger bothers and sister to the movies because they generally never had the money to pay their way to the movies but dad did, so he would take them. He was always happy to do that! Dad had a Rose Royce touring car that he would take them to the movies in. I remember that old car. It used to sit behind the granary on the farm. When I was still a young boy my granddad sold the car for nearly nothing. Dad always found something to laugh about even in the worst of times. When others were feeling bad he could and would always find a way to make them laugh and feel better.
The
accident that took my dad from me happen in a town called Harmon in
North Dakota at 3:10 pm on January 15
1951. The cause of the accident was a failure to obey a Meet
Order. My dad was a student fireman for the Northern Pacific
Railway. It was claimed that the Engineer was helping my dad with
the fire because
dad was not able to maintain the proper amount of steam pressure and
was not watching the tracks ahead. As a result engine
1756, my Dad's
engine, overshoot the
switch that it was to stop at and plowed head-on into engine 1837.
Dad's engine was moving 25 mph and 1837 was stopped. The
impact pushed 1837 backward some 75 feet. Dad's train being
loaded, the weight of the load, pushed the tender up into the cab
of his engine and
crushed him. My dad died in this wreck and the engineer was
injured.
The wreck at Harmon North Dakota was the last ALL steam ALL Northern Pacific Train wreck!
After the Harmon wreck 1756 was rebuilt and put back into service. On March 16 1955, as with many of those graceful old steamers, 1756 was sent to the scrap yards. Now, all that is left of 1756 are a few pictures and the memories of an old steamer that on a cold day in January, in Harmon North Dakota, took my dad's life.
More will be added to this story and web page as I get it.
A story of my dad's wreck is about to be published in the Quarterly Magazine called the Mainstreeter. It is a very nice story about the wreck but I do have questions about it. One of the issues is how the Engineer got out of the cab prior to the crash!
The ICC report in father down on this page! The Investigation transcript is here! This pdf file is 8 or more megs in size. Those that are on dailup will need to be patient while it loads. I would suggest downloading it!
My Dad, Billy B. Rogers.
On some official records he was Billy and on others he was William.
Born on November 13 1921- Died at 3:10 pm on January 15 1951 on engine 1756 in Harmon North Dakota.
Dad is 28 years old in this picture.
Go here for more pictures of My Dad
1756
Built in 1917 by Alco-Brooks, scrapped March 16, 1955 after 38 years of service.
In this picture notice how the first and second set of drivers of 1756 are off the ground.
In these pictures you can see allot of snow. Here are 3 closest locations to Harmon that have weather data on January 15, 1951.
Tmax Tmin Snow Fall Snow Depth
Center, ND: 26 F 8 F 0 " 8.0"
Bismark, ND: 28 F 6 F 0" 5.0"
Wilton, ND: 33 F 6 F 0" 14.0"
So we an idea of how cold it was in Harmon that day. I believe that Bismarck is the closest to Harmon.
Aerial Shot of Harmon North Dakota
Here is a 1938 picture of the Mandan Roundhouse where my dad started his fateful trip on January 15, 1951.
The three area News Papers each used the same picture changing only the caption. The three papers had the same basic story. Each made only slight changes in the story. The papers were:
File Number 3385
Railroad NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY
Date 01/15/1951
Location HARMON, ND.
Accident Type R.E.
Date: January 15, 1951
Railroad: Northern Pacific
Location: Harmon, N. Dak.
Kind of accident: Head-end collision
Trains involved: Freight : Freight
Train numbers: Extra 1756 East : Extra 1837 West
Engine numbers: 1756 : 1837
Consists: Auxiliary tender, : Auxiliary tender,
51 cars, caboose : 63 cars caboose
Estimated speeds: 25 m.p.h. : Standing
Operation: Timetable and train orders
Track: Single; 2 degrees curve; level
Weather: Clear
Time: 3:10 p.m.
Casualties: 1 killed; 1 injured
Cause: Failure to obey meet order
Accident near Harman, K. Dak., on January 15, 1951, caused by failure to obey a meet order.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 1
PATTERSON, Commissioner:
On January 15, 1951, there was a head-end collision between two freight trains on the Northern Pacific Railway near Harmon, N. Dak., which resulted in the death of one employee, and the injury of one employee.
Diagram
Report No. 3385 Northern Pacific Railway Harmon, N. Dak. January 15, 1951
Location of Accident and Method of Operation
This accident occurred on that part of the Fargo Division extending between Killdeer and Mandan, N. Dak.,
122.2 miles. This is a single-track line, over which trains are operated by timetable and train orders. There is no block system in use. At Harmon, 111.1 miles east of Killdeer, a siding 3,339 feet in length is located south of the main track. The east switch of this siding is 2,673 feet east of the station. The accident occurred on the main track at a point 2,009 feet east of the east siding-switch. From the west there, are, in succession, a tangent 4,775 feet in length, and a 2 degrees curve to the left 1,333 feet to the point of accident and 1,047 feet eastward. From the east there are, in succession, a tangent 1,346 feet in length, a 2 degrees curve to the left 838 feet, a tangent 1,129 feet and the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade is level.
This carrier's operating rules read in part as follows:
14. ENGINE WHISTLE SIGNALS.
* * *
The signals prescribed are illustrated by "o" for short sounds: "-----" for longer sounds. * * *
* * *
SOUND INDICATION
* * *
(n) - - o Approaching meeting or waiting points.
* * * See Rule S-90
* * *
S-87. * * *
Extra trains * * * will be governed by train orders with respect to opposing extra trains
S-88. At meeting points between extra trains, the train in the inferior time-table direction must take the siding
* * *
S-89 (A). * * *
At train order meeting points, the train holding the main track must stop clear of the switch used by the train to be met in going on siding unless the train to be met is clear of the main track and switch is properly lined.
S-30. On trains equipped with communicating signal system the conductor must give signal * * * to the
engineer immediately after passing the last station but not less than one mile preceding a schedule meeting point with a train of the same or superior class or a point where by train order it is to meet, or has to wait for, an opposing train. The engineer will immediately reply with signal 14 (n). If the engineer fails to answer by signal 14
(n), the conductor must take immediate action to atop the train.
On other trains, the engineer will give signal 14 (n) at least one mile before reaching a meeting or waiting point.
204. * * *
* * *
Engineers must show train orders to firemen and when practicable to forward trainmen. Conductors must show train orders when practicable to trainmen.
FORMS OF TRAIN ORDERS.
S-A.
Fixing Meeting Points for Opposing Trains.
(1.) No. 1 meet No 2 at B.
* * *
Trains receiving these orders will run with respect to each other to the designated points and there meet in the manner prescribed by the rules.
Timetable special instructions provide that east-bound trains are superior to trains of the same class in the
opposite direction.
The maximum authorized speed for the trains involved was 35 miles per hour.
Description of Accident
Extra 1756 East, an east-bound freight train, consisted of engine 1756, an auxiliary tender, 51 cars and a
caboose. At Sanger, the last open office, 16.99 miles west of Harmon, the crew received copies of train order No. 423 reading in part as follows:
Eng 1837 run Extra Mandan to Beulah and, return to Mandan Meet Extra 1756
East at Harmon * * *
Beulah is located 73.6 miles west of Mandan. This train departed from Sanger at 2:30 p.m., passed the east siding-switch at Harmon, where it was required to wait unless Extra 1837 West was into clear on the siding, and while moving at an estimated speed of 25 miles per hour it collided with Extra 1837 West at a point 2,009 feet east of the east siding-switch.
Extra 1837 West, a west-bound freight train, consisted of engine 1837, an auxiliary tender, 63 cars and a
caboose. At Mandan, the last open office, the crew received copies of train order No. 423. This train departed from Mandan at 2:30 p.m. and stopped on the main track at a point 2,009 feet east of the east siding-switch at Harmon. A few seconds later it was struck by Extra 1756 East.
The engine of Extra 1756 East was derailed and stopped upright and in line with the track. The tender was
derailed and stooped upright, with the rear end north of the track and at an angle of about 30 degrees to the engine. The auxiliary tender was derailed to the south and overturned. The first nine cars were derailed and stopped in various positions on or near the track. The front truck of the tenth car was derailed. The engine and the tender were considerably damaged. The auxiliary tender and the first to the eighth cars, inclusive, were badly damaged. The engine of Extra 1837 West was moved eastward approximately 75 feet by the impact. The engine was derailed and stopped upright and in line with the track. The tender was derailed to the south and stopped upright and at an angle of about 40 degrees to the engine. The auxiliary tender was overturned to the south. The first two cars and the front truck of the third car were derailed. The first car stopped upright and south of the track. The second and the third cars stopped upright and in line with the track. The engine and the tender were considerable damaged. The auxiliary tender and the first car were badly damaged.
The fireman of Extra 1756 East was killed. The engineer of Extra 1756 East was injured.
The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 3:10 p.m.
During the 30-day period preceding the day of the accident the average daily movement in the vicinity of the point of accident was 7.36 trains.
Discussion
The rules of this carrier provide that extra trains will be governed by train orders with respect to opposing extra trains. At train-order meeting points the train holding the main track must stop clear of the switch used by the train to be met in going on siding unless the train to be met is clear of the main track and switch is properly lined. The engineer will give signal 14 (n) at least 1 mile before reaching a meeting or waiting point. Engineers must show train orders to fireman and when practicable to forward trainmen. Conductors must show train orders when practicable to trainmen.
As Extra 1756 East was approaching Harmon the speed was about 25 miles pr hour. The brakes of this train had been tested and had functioned properly when used en route. The enginemen were in the cab of the engine. The front brakeman was in the brakemen's booth on the tender. The conductor, the flagman and the swing brakeman were in the caboose. All members of the crew, except the front brakeman, had read and understood the train order which established Harmon as the meeting point with Extra 1837 West. The engineer said that during most of the trip the fireman had difficulty in maintaining adequate steam pressure and it had been necessary for him to assist the fireman on several occasions. It was the fireman's first trip over this territory. When the train reached a point about 1.5 miles west of Harmon the steam pressure was about 50 pounds below normal. The fireman was attempting to correct fire conditions, and the engineer again went to his assistance. The engineer said that it did not occur to him that his train was closely approaching the meeting point with Extra 1837 West, and he did not sound the engine-whistle signal for the meeting point. He said that after shaking the grates and raking and leveling the fire he leaned across his seat box with his head out of the window to recover from his exertions. He first became aware of something being wrong when he saw a person a short distance in front of the engine giving stop signals. He immediately moved the brake valve to emergency position. The collision occurred a few seconds later. The front brakeman said that when the accident occurred he was looking back along the train and he was not aware that the brakes had been applied. As the train was approaching Harmon the conductor was seated on the left side of the caboose and the flagman and the swing brakeman were seated on the right side. The caboose was of the bay-window type. These employees had discussed the provisions of train order No. 423, and the conductor said that he thought the speed of the train was properly controlled approaching the meeting point. When the caboose was in the immediate vicinity of the west siding-switch the swing brakeman saw stop signals being given by maintenance-of-way employees, who had observed the approach of Extra 1837 West. He called a warning and took immediate action to stop the train by the use of the conductor's valve. The conductor and the swing brakeman said they thought that the speed of their train was reduced to about 12 miles per hour before the accident occurred.
As Extra 1837 West was approaching the point where the accident occurred the speed was about 10 miles per hour. The enginemen were in their respective positions in the cab of the engine. The front brakeman was in the brakeman's booth on the tender. The conductor, the flagman and the swing brakeman were in the caboose. The brakes of this train had been tested. The enginemen observed smoke from the engine of Extra 1756 East as that train approached Harmon. Then Extra 1756 East was in the immediate vicinity of Harmon they became concerned because it appeared that Extra 1756 East would not stop short of the east siding-switch. The engineer made a brake application and, as the train stopped, the employees on the engine saw that Extra 1756 East had passed the switch. The engineer sounded a warning on the engine whistle, and the fireman alighted from the engine and ran toward the approaching train giving stop signals. The fireman said that he had reached a point about 150 feet west of his engine when the engineer of Extra 1756 East saw his signals and took action to stop the train. The engineman and the front brakeman of Extra 1837 West thought that the speed of Extra 1756 East was about 25 miles per hour at the time of the collision.
Cause
It is found that this accident was caused by failure to obey a meet order.
Dated at Washington, D. C., this thirteenth day of March, 1951.
By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.
(SEAL) W. P. BARTEL,
Secretary.
FOOTNOTE:
1. Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was s referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.
The wreck at Harmon North Dakota was the last ALL steam ALL Northern Pacific Train wreck!
After the Harmon wreck 1756 was rebuilt and put back into service. On March 16 1955, as with many of those graceful old steamers, 1756 was sent to the scrap yards. Now, all that is left of 1756 are a few pictures and the memories of an old steamer that on a cold day in January, in Harmon North Dakota, took my dad's life.
The trip to Harmon
54 years, 8 months, and 29 days after the wreck I want to Harmon North Dakota to see the wreck site and to discuss with the Morton County North Dakota people that are sponsoring the building of a large recreational dam the possibilities of a permanent memorial for my dad at the dam site. I don't yet know if that will happen but I will certainly pray for it and I hope that many railroaders as well as railfans will also!
People that may have anything that I can use about my dad, the wreck, or may just want to comment on the site may email me at "Mike"! I would l know more about the "Goose"! The Goose was numbered B-6 and ran the North branch out of Mandan. I would like pictures of the "Goose".I would like pictures of the wreck that I don't have. Right now I have 27 pictures of the wreck. Someone may have pictures of my dad being removed from 1756. I would like to see them. Also I would like pictures of the Caboose my dad train was pulling. It was numbered in the 1500 series. I am hoping that someone know the number of it.
There was a problem with the email. If people have emailed me but did not get a response should email me again. I sorry for the problem this may have cause for everyone, but it should be fixed now!
I am aware of a number of brass models of 1756. I would like to fine one but I am going to need your help. If you know where I might get one please email me.
54 years, 8 months, and 29 days after the wreck I want to Harmon North Dakota to see the wreck site and to discuss with the Morton County North Dakota people that are sponsoring the building of a large recreational dam the possibilities of a permanent memorial for my dad at the dam site. I don't yet know if that will happen but I will certainly pray for it and I hope that many railroaders as well as railfans will also!
People that may have anything that I can use about my dad, the wreck, or may just want to comment on the site may email me at "Mike"! I would l know more about the "Goose"! The Goose was numbered B-6 and ran the North branch out of Mandan. I would like pictures of the "Goose".I would like pictures of the wreck that I don't have. Right now I have 27 pictures of the wreck. Someone may have pictures of my dad being removed from 1756. I would like to see them. Also I would like pictures of the Caboose my dad train was pulling. It was numbered in the 1500 series. I am hoping that someone know the number of it.
There was a problem with the email. If people have emailed me but did not get a response should email me again. I sorry for the problem this may have cause for everyone, but it should be fixed now!
I am aware of a number of brass models of 1756. I would like to fine one but I am going to need your help. If you know where I might get one please email me.
More will be added to this story and web page as I get it.
Added December 27, 2006
A story of my dad's wreck is about to be published in the Quarterly Magazine called the Mainstreeter. It is a very nice story about the wreck but I do have questions about it. One of the issues is how the Engineer got out of the cab prior to the crash!
The ICC report in father down on this page! The Investigation transcript is here! This pdf file is 8 or more megs in size. Those that are on dailup will need to be patient while it loads. I would suggest downloading it!
My Dad, Billy B. Rogers.
On some official records he was Billy and on others he was William.
Born on November 13 1921- Died at 3:10 pm on January 15 1951 on engine 1756 in Harmon North Dakota.
Dad is 28 years old in this picture.
Go here for more pictures of My Dad
1756
Built in 1917 by Alco-Brooks, scrapped March 16, 1955 after 38 years of service.
Extra 1756 East,
my Dad's engine, is on
the left and Extra
1837 West is on the right nose to nose. The cars that were
attached to Extra 1837 West have been removed so the the Big Hook
(Wrecker) could get to the tender then the engine. The cars would
have been taken back to Mandan North Dakota The cars that were
attached to dad's train are still behind it.
In this picture the two engines are still nose to nose. Note how the cab of 1756 is twisted sideways. The jagged looking object on the right center of the picture is a part of one railcar.
Here is a shot of the other side of 1756. Look at how the cab smashed with the tender pushed into the cab.
In this picture the two engines are still nose to nose. Note how the cab of 1756 is twisted sideways. The jagged looking object on the right center of the picture is a part of one railcar.
Here is a shot of the other side of 1756. Look at how the cab smashed with the tender pushed into the cab.
In this picture you can see the "Big
Hook" is in place to begin work on 1837's tender. Some
locals are standing near an over turned coal car watching the work.
You see the loaded cars behind my Dad's engine.
In this picture notice how the first and second set of drivers of 1756 are off the ground.
In these pictures you can see allot of snow. Here are 3 closest locations to Harmon that have weather data on January 15, 1951.
Tmax Tmin Snow Fall Snow Depth
Center, ND: 26 F 8 F 0 " 8.0"
Bismark, ND: 28 F 6 F 0" 5.0"
Wilton, ND: 33 F 6 F 0" 14.0"
So we an idea of how cold it was in Harmon that day. I believe that Bismarck is the closest to Harmon.
Aerial Shot of Harmon North Dakota
Here is a 1938 picture of the Mandan Roundhouse where my dad started his fateful trip on January 15, 1951.
The three area News Papers each used the same picture changing only the caption. The three papers had the same basic story. Each made only slight changes in the story. The papers were:
The Mandan Daily Pioneer, The Bismarck Tribune,
and The Hazen Star
The
transcription of the new articles is not accurate! I missed some
words or phrases. I will try at a later date to fix this error!
Bits & Pieces page
(General Discussion)
(General Discussion)
The
ICC Report
File Number 3385
Railroad NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY
Date 01/15/1951
Location HARMON, ND.
Accident Type R.E.
3385
INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON
REPORT NO 3385
WASHINGTON
REPORT NO 3385
NORTHERN
PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY IN RE ACCIDENT NEAR HARMON
N. DAK., ON JANUARY 15, 1951
Report No. 3385
SUMMARY
N. DAK., ON JANUARY 15, 1951
Report No. 3385
SUMMARY
Date: January 15, 1951
Railroad: Northern Pacific
Location: Harmon, N. Dak.
Kind of accident: Head-end collision
Trains involved: Freight : Freight
Train numbers: Extra 1756 East : Extra 1837 West
Engine numbers: 1756 : 1837
Consists: Auxiliary tender, : Auxiliary tender,
51 cars, caboose : 63 cars caboose
Estimated speeds: 25 m.p.h. : Standing
Operation: Timetable and train orders
Track: Single; 2 degrees curve; level
Weather: Clear
Time: 3:10 p.m.
Casualties: 1 killed; 1 injured
Cause: Failure to obey meet order
INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION
REPORT NO. 3385
IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.
NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY
March 30, 1951
REPORT NO. 3385
IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.
NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY
March 30, 1951
Accident near Harman, K. Dak., on January 15, 1951, caused by failure to obey a meet order.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 1
PATTERSON, Commissioner:
On January 15, 1951, there was a head-end collision between two freight trains on the Northern Pacific Railway near Harmon, N. Dak., which resulted in the death of one employee, and the injury of one employee.
Diagram
Report No. 3385 Northern Pacific Railway Harmon, N. Dak. January 15, 1951
Location of Accident and Method of Operation
This accident occurred on that part of the Fargo Division extending between Killdeer and Mandan, N. Dak.,
122.2 miles. This is a single-track line, over which trains are operated by timetable and train orders. There is no block system in use. At Harmon, 111.1 miles east of Killdeer, a siding 3,339 feet in length is located south of the main track. The east switch of this siding is 2,673 feet east of the station. The accident occurred on the main track at a point 2,009 feet east of the east siding-switch. From the west there, are, in succession, a tangent 4,775 feet in length, and a 2 degrees curve to the left 1,333 feet to the point of accident and 1,047 feet eastward. From the east there are, in succession, a tangent 1,346 feet in length, a 2 degrees curve to the left 838 feet, a tangent 1,129 feet and the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade is level.
This carrier's operating rules read in part as follows:
14. ENGINE WHISTLE SIGNALS.
* * *
The signals prescribed are illustrated by "o" for short sounds: "-----" for longer sounds. * * *
* * *
SOUND INDICATION
* * *
(n) - - o Approaching meeting or waiting points.
* * * See Rule S-90
* * *
S-87. * * *
Extra trains * * * will be governed by train orders with respect to opposing extra trains
S-88. At meeting points between extra trains, the train in the inferior time-table direction must take the siding
* * *
S-89 (A). * * *
At train order meeting points, the train holding the main track must stop clear of the switch used by the train to be met in going on siding unless the train to be met is clear of the main track and switch is properly lined.
S-30. On trains equipped with communicating signal system the conductor must give signal * * * to the
engineer immediately after passing the last station but not less than one mile preceding a schedule meeting point with a train of the same or superior class or a point where by train order it is to meet, or has to wait for, an opposing train. The engineer will immediately reply with signal 14 (n). If the engineer fails to answer by signal 14
(n), the conductor must take immediate action to atop the train.
On other trains, the engineer will give signal 14 (n) at least one mile before reaching a meeting or waiting point.
204. * * *
* * *
Engineers must show train orders to firemen and when practicable to forward trainmen. Conductors must show train orders when practicable to trainmen.
FORMS OF TRAIN ORDERS.
S-A.
Fixing Meeting Points for Opposing Trains.
(1.) No. 1 meet No 2 at B.
* * *
Trains receiving these orders will run with respect to each other to the designated points and there meet in the manner prescribed by the rules.
Timetable special instructions provide that east-bound trains are superior to trains of the same class in the
opposite direction.
The maximum authorized speed for the trains involved was 35 miles per hour.
Description of Accident
Extra 1756 East, an east-bound freight train, consisted of engine 1756, an auxiliary tender, 51 cars and a
caboose. At Sanger, the last open office, 16.99 miles west of Harmon, the crew received copies of train order No. 423 reading in part as follows:
Eng 1837 run Extra Mandan to Beulah and, return to Mandan Meet Extra 1756
East at Harmon * * *
Beulah is located 73.6 miles west of Mandan. This train departed from Sanger at 2:30 p.m., passed the east siding-switch at Harmon, where it was required to wait unless Extra 1837 West was into clear on the siding, and while moving at an estimated speed of 25 miles per hour it collided with Extra 1837 West at a point 2,009 feet east of the east siding-switch.
Extra 1837 West, a west-bound freight train, consisted of engine 1837, an auxiliary tender, 63 cars and a
caboose. At Mandan, the last open office, the crew received copies of train order No. 423. This train departed from Mandan at 2:30 p.m. and stopped on the main track at a point 2,009 feet east of the east siding-switch at Harmon. A few seconds later it was struck by Extra 1756 East.
The engine of Extra 1756 East was derailed and stopped upright and in line with the track. The tender was
derailed and stooped upright, with the rear end north of the track and at an angle of about 30 degrees to the engine. The auxiliary tender was derailed to the south and overturned. The first nine cars were derailed and stopped in various positions on or near the track. The front truck of the tenth car was derailed. The engine and the tender were considerably damaged. The auxiliary tender and the first to the eighth cars, inclusive, were badly damaged. The engine of Extra 1837 West was moved eastward approximately 75 feet by the impact. The engine was derailed and stopped upright and in line with the track. The tender was derailed to the south and stopped upright and at an angle of about 40 degrees to the engine. The auxiliary tender was overturned to the south. The first two cars and the front truck of the third car were derailed. The first car stopped upright and south of the track. The second and the third cars stopped upright and in line with the track. The engine and the tender were considerable damaged. The auxiliary tender and the first car were badly damaged.
The fireman of Extra 1756 East was killed. The engineer of Extra 1756 East was injured.
The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 3:10 p.m.
During the 30-day period preceding the day of the accident the average daily movement in the vicinity of the point of accident was 7.36 trains.
Discussion
The rules of this carrier provide that extra trains will be governed by train orders with respect to opposing extra trains. At train-order meeting points the train holding the main track must stop clear of the switch used by the train to be met in going on siding unless the train to be met is clear of the main track and switch is properly lined. The engineer will give signal 14 (n) at least 1 mile before reaching a meeting or waiting point. Engineers must show train orders to fireman and when practicable to forward trainmen. Conductors must show train orders when practicable to trainmen.
As Extra 1756 East was approaching Harmon the speed was about 25 miles pr hour. The brakes of this train had been tested and had functioned properly when used en route. The enginemen were in the cab of the engine. The front brakeman was in the brakemen's booth on the tender. The conductor, the flagman and the swing brakeman were in the caboose. All members of the crew, except the front brakeman, had read and understood the train order which established Harmon as the meeting point with Extra 1837 West. The engineer said that during most of the trip the fireman had difficulty in maintaining adequate steam pressure and it had been necessary for him to assist the fireman on several occasions. It was the fireman's first trip over this territory. When the train reached a point about 1.5 miles west of Harmon the steam pressure was about 50 pounds below normal. The fireman was attempting to correct fire conditions, and the engineer again went to his assistance. The engineer said that it did not occur to him that his train was closely approaching the meeting point with Extra 1837 West, and he did not sound the engine-whistle signal for the meeting point. He said that after shaking the grates and raking and leveling the fire he leaned across his seat box with his head out of the window to recover from his exertions. He first became aware of something being wrong when he saw a person a short distance in front of the engine giving stop signals. He immediately moved the brake valve to emergency position. The collision occurred a few seconds later. The front brakeman said that when the accident occurred he was looking back along the train and he was not aware that the brakes had been applied. As the train was approaching Harmon the conductor was seated on the left side of the caboose and the flagman and the swing brakeman were seated on the right side. The caboose was of the bay-window type. These employees had discussed the provisions of train order No. 423, and the conductor said that he thought the speed of the train was properly controlled approaching the meeting point. When the caboose was in the immediate vicinity of the west siding-switch the swing brakeman saw stop signals being given by maintenance-of-way employees, who had observed the approach of Extra 1837 West. He called a warning and took immediate action to stop the train by the use of the conductor's valve. The conductor and the swing brakeman said they thought that the speed of their train was reduced to about 12 miles per hour before the accident occurred.
As Extra 1837 West was approaching the point where the accident occurred the speed was about 10 miles per hour. The enginemen were in their respective positions in the cab of the engine. The front brakeman was in the brakeman's booth on the tender. The conductor, the flagman and the swing brakeman were in the caboose. The brakes of this train had been tested. The enginemen observed smoke from the engine of Extra 1756 East as that train approached Harmon. Then Extra 1756 East was in the immediate vicinity of Harmon they became concerned because it appeared that Extra 1756 East would not stop short of the east siding-switch. The engineer made a brake application and, as the train stopped, the employees on the engine saw that Extra 1756 East had passed the switch. The engineer sounded a warning on the engine whistle, and the fireman alighted from the engine and ran toward the approaching train giving stop signals. The fireman said that he had reached a point about 150 feet west of his engine when the engineer of Extra 1756 East saw his signals and took action to stop the train. The engineman and the front brakeman of Extra 1837 West thought that the speed of Extra 1756 East was about 25 miles per hour at the time of the collision.
Cause
It is found that this accident was caused by failure to obey a meet order.
Dated at Washington, D. C., this thirteenth day of March, 1951.
By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.
(SEAL) W. P. BARTEL,
Secretary.
FOOTNOTE:
1. Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was s referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.